Fishing for Putin

Russian trawlers have over many years landed major volumes of fish in north Norwegian ports such as Båtsfjord.

The Netherlands is the most important trading post for Russian fish. But controls on illegal fishing are shockingly inadequate. The Netherlands thus facilitates a multibillion-dollar business for Russia, and indirectly boosts Putin's war chest. Meanwhile, cod stocks in the Barents Sea are declining rapidly.

This investigative story is published in cooperation with the Spit collective for De Groene Amsterdammer

On the quay of the Frigo Terminal in the Dutch port town Velsen, there is a Norwegian reefer, a gigantic vessel for frozen products, where the cargo space can freeze up to twenty degrees. Men in orange vests drive back and forth on forklifts to unload pallets of stacked boxes of cod and haddock from the Barents Sea. From the quay, the cargo is temporarily stored in one of the adjacent cold stores. At the rear, a forklift truck drives the pallets of fish out again, beep-beeping in reverse. There is a long line of trucks lined up to fill their loading spaces with boxes. Images of fish on the outside of the trucks reveal the contents of the cargo. One of the drivers, dressed in a reflective jacket, jeans and his hair slicked back with gel, has just finished loading his truck. “You see the craziest trucks here, from all over Europe,” he says. 'I'm always amazed by this.' 

A coldstore at the port in Velsen. Here the frozen fish is temporarily stored and then transported throughout Europe.

The seaport of IJmuiden, of which the terminal in Velsen-Noord is part, has developed over the past decade as a hotspot for the European fish trade. For years, the Seaport of IJmuiden, a public-private company of which the (fishing) companies in the port are the largest shareholders, has been committed to the development of this 'logistics hub for fish'. Entrepreneurs try to route all kinds of trade flows of fishery products through the cold stores on the North Sea coast.

But the port's private ambition to be a European fish trade champion, comes with a public responsibility to check that no illegal catches are landed. An investigation by the Spit collective into the trade in Russian cod however, shows that these controls were shockingly inadequate for years. That is extra problematic because Russian fishing companies that land their catches in Dutch ports, have been caught in the past for shrewd fishing fraud. “If they are fishing illegally, Dutch inspections will not reveal this,” Norwegian inspectors respond to our findings. In addition, Norebo, the largest Russian fishing company now active in the port of IJmuiden, has close ties with the Kremlin. In this way, the Netherlands may also be adding to the Russian war chest. “We are directly facing the Kremlin.”

Russia is the main supplier of whitefish for the Europese market. Cod and haddock enters Europe largely via the Netherlands. In 2023, this would have been a total of 98 million kilos, as can be seen from figures from the NVWA. Russian refrigerated ships packed with fish arrived in Dutch ports almost every week.

Until in May this year, the reefer Belomorye, which was on its way from Murmansk to the Groningen Eemshaven, was suddenly no longer welcome. The ship, which sails on behalf of Norebo, changed course towards Velsen, but there too the authorities prohibited the skipper from entering the port. Earlier that month Pointer (KRO-NCRV) indicated that the Russian refrigerated cargo vessel may have been guilty of espionage in the strategically important Eemshaven. Then Minister Mark Harbers of infrastructure and water management decided to keep out Russian refrigerated ships. The moment Harbers announced his decision, the Belomorye turned its bow to the north and sailed to Spitsbergen.

The Belomorye is owned and operated by Norebo, the Russian fishery company with ties to Russian authorities.

The ship came to a halt there a week later in a deserted fjord between snow-capped mountain peaks. Marinetraffic, a website that maps ship movements, shows how the Belomorye floated around for a few days until the Norwegian ship Silver Copenhagen entered the bay to transfer the cargo. The Belomorye sailed back to her home port of Murmansk. The Silver Copenhagen, welcome in the Netherlands thanks to the Norwegian flag, still set sail for Velsen in North Holland with a cargo space full of frozen Russian fish.

It is almost a weekly occurrence: Russian fishing vessels load their catch on a reefer in a remote fjord near Spitsbergen, according to the Norwegian Public Broadcaster a shadowy, 'hidden Russian port'. From there a Norwegian reefer takes the fish to Velsen, after a pit-stop in Murmansk. 

A Norwegian reefer lands fish in the Port of Velsen. Since the ban on Russian reefers in Dutch ports, fish from Russia has been brought in on Norwegian reefers.

The Netherlands thus tackled the danger of espionage, but trade continues as usual. Unlike the United States, which has banned fish from Russia since the invasion of Ukraine, fishery products are largely exempt from European sanctions, except for caviar and shellfish. That makes fishing an important money machine for Russia. After oil and grain, fish is the third largest source of income from export. Total fish export revenues amounted to $7 billion in 2021. No less than 20 percent of that, $1.5 billion, Russia earned through the export of fish to the Netherlands. Following the imposition of sanctions in 2022, exports of fish products to the European Union grew by 19 percent, the trade association for Russian industrial fisheries (VARPE) reports. 

And those are just the official numbers. There is a danger there are millions of kilos of illegally caught fish as well. In 2006, Norwegian fisheries inspectors Tor Glistrup and Björnar Myrseth conducted an investigation in Dutch ports. That was not easy. “I was practically thrown out of the port of Eemshaven,” says Glistrup, who has now retired, via video link. In the first decade of this century, he and his colleagues discovered a huge fraud. ‘We found out how Russian fishing vessels used duplicate sets of documents. This way they could launder illegal fish for which they had no fishing rights.’ Such fishing rights, or quotas, are distributed annually and are intended to prevent overfishing. The Norwegian inspectors concluded that the Russian fleet traded at least 100 million kilos of illegally caught cod between 2002 and 2008, worth hundreds of millions of euros. That trade largely ran through the Netherlands.

Truck waiting to load fish in the north Norwegian port of Båtsfjord.

How sophisticated the Russians committed fraud in those years can be seen in a 2008 video Glistrup shared with us. An inspector from the AID, the predecessor of the NVWA, cuts open a cardboard box that, according to the label, contains haddock. But when the man peels off the box, a second box appears, like a Matryoshka doll, with the much more expensive 'cod' on the label. Packaging cod as haddock is a trick to catch more cod than allowed.

The Norwegian investigation yielded 53 well-documented cases that were sent to court in Russia. But in Moscow there was virtually no publicity about it and half of the files disappeared into a drawer. In the Netherlands, where most fish were landed, there were no legal consequences. However, there was stricter control, says Glistrup. Russia replaced corrupt officials and Russian reefers now had to stop in Murmansk, where the authorities could check. From 2007 onwards, fish landings in the Netherlands would be subject to so-called port state control, additional inspections in Dutch ports. “We felt that the problems of illegal fishing had been solved.”

On paper, the EU has an almost watertight system for preventing illegal catches. For example, every ship that unloads fish must provide catch certificates, with which countries guarantee that the fish has been caught legally, within the applicable quota. The problem with this is the dependence on other countries, says Vanya Vulperhorst of Oceana, a non-profit organization that fights for ocean conservation. 'The Netherlands receive documents from Russia, from which Russia says: this fish is legal, you can let it in with confidence. It is then up to the Netherlands how much effort you make to find out whether that is really correct.'

The Netherlands is completely lost for the checks. In May 2019, a delegation from the European Fisheries Inspection Agency came on a working visit to Velsen. The conclusions in the resulting report, which we received through an appeal to the Open Government Act (Woo/FOI), are not mild: the catches are not weighed, while the NVWA is legally obliged to ensure that this is done. The penalties that the Netherlands imposes if a violation is detected can hardly be taken seriously. A reefer that landed fish in 2017 without the correct catch certificates was fined 5,000 euros. “That is less than the price of one pallet of fish, while a reefer transports thousands of pallets,” the European inspectors write. The Netherlands also does not achieve the minimum number of inspections, the report states. The European Commission started official proceedings against the Netherlands for non-compliance with the control rules. That case is still ongoing. In the meantime, the NVWA promised improvement. 

But according to the NGO Environmental Justice Foundation (EJF), which requested data in Brussels, Dutch inspections are still substandard. The only two EU Member States where Russian fish is landed are Spain (4 to 8 ships yearly between 2021 and 2023) and the Netherlands (between 30 and 43 ships). But while Spain inspected all landings, the Netherlands only checked two of the dozens of Russian reefers that visited Dutch ports in 2022 and 2023. The NVWA says it thus meets the requirement that at least 7.5 percent of landings from all non-EU countries are physically inspected. But the inspection organization does not achieve this for only the ships from Russia, emphasizes Amélie Giardini of EJF. 'It is simply unacceptable that the 'fishing hub of Europe' is not doing even the bare minimum of checks. Especially because the Netherlands is the main gateway for Russian fish within the EU. In this way, the Netherlands makes a hole in the European policy to keep the market free of illegally caught fish.'

The recent inspection forms that Spit requested in a Freedom of Information request, also do not indicate any improvements. We received almost a thousand pages of paperwork from all inspections on Russian refrigerated ships between 2018 and 2023. We also studied, in collaboration with data journalists at Data Desk, the customs details of Russian whitefish exported to the Netherlands. This gives the impression that landed fish are still not weighed. The inspection forms invariably contain exactly the same 'weighed weight' that the Russian companies stated in the export papers two weeks earlier. On 150 of the 167 inspection forms, the NVWA recorded a '0.0%' difference between the weighing results of the fish on board and the catches reported by fishermen. Even as this concerns loads of millions of kilos. Tor Glistrup, the retired Norwegian inspector, is shocked by these findings. 'It appears that the NVWA has copied these numbers blindly, and does not carry out any real checks.' 

In response, the NVWA indicates that the weighing is done by the fishing companies themselves, and the NVWA supervises. The 0.0 percent difference between the weighing result and the customs details, results from the NVWA’s way of working: if a ship has less fish on board than stated in the catch documents, the inspectors record a difference of 0, because there is no risk of illegal catches. According to a source within the fisheries inspection on EU level, who does not want to be named, the NVWA is thus creating uncertainty. 'The Netherlands is obliged to check that catch data is correct. By writing down 0 percent difference on inspection forms, while those differences do exist, you do not comply with those European rules.'

Glistrup's eye falls on another flaw in the inspections. From 2022, inspectors will transfer the weight of fish products such as fillets into a box on the form intended for 'live weight'. That is the higher weight of the whole live fish before, for example, it is made into fillets and the head and tail are cut off. That higher number is used to write off quotas. This could lead to Russia debiting 100 kilos of a company's cod quota, while to produce that cod fillet more than three times as much weight of fish is needed, and 300 kilos of the quota should actually have been deducted. “Meddling with those conversion weights is a very lucrative form of fraud,” says Glistrup.

In response, the NVWA indicates that it does not know how this is possible. 'We can only speak for the work processes used by the NVWA.' It is also impossible to check with the Russian authorities what quota have been deducted. 

Glistrup expects that the findings will cause great unrest in Norway. “We thought we had illegal fishing under control and that we could rely on it port state control, the tightened control system. That turns out not to be the case.' In recent years, cod stocks in the Barents Sea have declined alarmingly. Earlier this month it was announced that the cod quota will be reduced by another 25 percent next year, because there is hardly any fish left. 'It is a drama that is unfolding before our eyes. We are moving quickly towards the critical lower threshold after which the fish stock can no longer recover.' In particular small fishing companies and the fish processing industry fear having to lay off people. An organization that stands up for fishing rights in the Sami community along the Norwegian north coast even fears child poverty. 

Russian fishing vessel Melkart 5 in the Norwegian port of Båtsfjord.

“Illegal fishing is hardly mentioned in Norway as a possible cause of the sudden collapse of fish stocks,” says Glistrup. 'The situation cannot be compared to twenty years ago. We are no longer dealing with individual fishing companies, but with the Kremlin, a neighbor with a war economy. You might wonder whether he is very concerned about the fish stocks in the Barents Sea.'

We also tested our findings with a source within the European Fisheries Inspectorate, who did not wish to be named. This source confirms that the Dutch inspections are still dysfunctional. 'This indicates that the Netherlands is a hub for illegal fishing activities. The profit made from this can indeed also be used to finance the war in Ukraine.' 

Norebo Netherlands B.V. is located on the Velserkade, a few doors next to the Frigo Terminal. office. The Russian company Norebo is, according to the customs data we studied, by far the largest exporter of Russian fish to the Netherlands. Nearly half of all shipments come from one of Norebo's forty fishing vessels. It is also the company that, under the old name Ocean Trawlers, was linked by Norwegian inspectors to buying illegally caught fish in the early 2000s. Although the company was never convicted for this.

Norebo's growth has accelerated in recent years through its aggressive purchase of other fishing companies, allowing them to obtain more and more quotas. The company also received help from above. At the end of 2022, the Kremlin announced a sudden redistribution of quotas. Norebo was allocated the largest share of the quota, reportedly thanks to effective lobbying of the Kremlin. Norebo is currently building ten additional trawlers, four of which are destined for the Barents Sea.

The new fish processing plant opened by Norebo in Minkino outside Murmansk in 2016.

The warm relationship with the Russian government is even clearer in the endless series of loans that the state bank Sberbank provided to the company, as a Russian group of investigative journalists from Dossier Center found out. It is the loans from this Kremlin-controlled bank that laid the financial foundation for Norebo to grow so large in a short time. A Norebo subsidiary donated one million rubles (about 15,000 euros at the time) to United Russia, the party affiliated with Putin, in 2017. 

Norebo does not respond to our questions substantively and writes in a response that the company has no ties with the Kremlin and that their trading activities in the European Union are frequently monitored and are fully in accordance with European laws and regulations. 'Norebo prefers to focus on combating global food shortages, promoting sustainable fishing and supporting local communities with sports activities and health initiatives.'

The state of Russia however, has big plans for the fishing industry. In a report issued by the Kremlin in April this year, Ilya Shestakov, the director of the Russian Fisheries Agency, talks about the industry's achievements. In front of him is a shiny brochure with figures about fish catches. The interior of the room is classic with lots of shiny wood and gold decorations. There is a Russian flag against the wall and on the table a marble pen tray decorated with the coat of arms of Russia, a golden eagle with three crowns, which represent the unity of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. 

The port of Murmansk.

The brochure shows excellent figures. “Russian fishermen caught 5.3 million tons of fish. This never happened before in the past thirty years. And a fishing vessel under the Russian flag caught 90,000 tons of fish in the same year, a world record among all fishing vessels," reports the fishing boss. That is good news for Putin's treasury. Especially because in 2023 he introduced a new tax law, which should increase government revenues from fishing tenfold. “Shipbuilding, factories, and quotas,” Putin summarizes his plans to build 25 fish factories and 105 ships to catch six million tons of fish annually.

In Norway, fisheries inspectors are very concerned about it. “We see that Russia is increasingly active in the Russian part of the Barents Sea,” says former inspector Tor Glistrup. That is a problem, because that is where mainly the young cod are found. If you catch those young fish before they have a chance to reproduce, the fish population cannot recover. It seems that overfishing continues.' Glistrup notes that Russia is not the only culprit. 'The entire management of the cod fishery is not in order. Not even in Norway and the EU.'

It raises the question of what the Netherlands should do with this trade flow. European fisheries inspectors see the Netherlands as a hub for illegal fish due to inadequate controls. Moreover, the money earned from it ends up in the treasury of a country that uses it to finance a war against Europe. 

This is clear to Karel Burger Dirven, honorary consul of Ukraine. 'It is undesirable for us to fill Russia's war chest with the import of whitefish from Russia. This is not a small amount, but a lot of money. In fact, with this fish you acquire an economic Trojan horse. This must now be addressed.' 

According to Burger Dirven, the Netherlands does not have to wait for Europe. 'Every country can impose extra-legal sanctions, heavier than the EU does. No other port in Europe than Velsen is as suitable for the transit of Russian fish. By closing this gateway, you will be dealing a major blow to this trade route.” 

Burger Dirven also makes this call to the industry. “Stop processing fish from Russia, even if it costs money.” According to him, this is out of proportion to the deaths that now occur every day in Ukraine. 'Everyone is talking about the need to stop the war. But principles cost money. Put your money where your mouth is.’ 

Lawyer Heleen over de Linden, an expert in the field of sanctions, is in favor of this. The problem is that Europe is still too dependent on Russian whitefish. Over de Linden sees an interim solution in a kind of quota. 'Imposing a maximum on the amount of fish we still import from Russia, and reducing it further and further. Then entrepreneurs have time to look for an alternative trade flow.'

In principle, the Netherlands is not in favor of national sanctions, because they undermine the common market," the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, Food Security and Nature wrote in a joint response. 'National sanctions are expected to lead to a shift in trade flows to other EU countries and can therefore easily be circumvented.' Sanctioning food is extra sensitive, because of 'food security in countries outside the European Union.' 

In collaboration with Alesha Marokhovskaya

This investigation was developed with the support of Journalism Fund Europe

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